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Summary: 
This article presents the results of a survey among more than six hundred bankers in the 
Netherlands about banking culture. It addresses the question why trust in banks remains 
so low (45% of clients trust banks in the Netherlands). The key findings indicate that 
the problem is not so much immoral bankers or a few rotten apples but rather the 
dominance of a competitive banking culture. The findings suggest that clients’ trust may 
be regained when banks leave behind their focus on performance targets, financial 
incentives, and behavioral regulation and move instead to a caring culture with a focus 
on relationships and open discussion of ethical dilemma’s. 
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In 2008, a top-four bank of the Netherlands, ABN Amro Bank, was saved by the state. 
A smaller bank, DSB, went bankrupt. And more than a million Dutch savers who had 
put their money on a savings account at the internet bank Icesave were compensated by 
the Dutch deposit guarantee system. In 2013, the second top-four bank was saved by the 
state, SNS Reaal, when not only the failure of Mortgage Backed Securities had left its 
marks in the banking sector, but also the euro crisis had shown its impact. 
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The Dutch population turned furious at banks and bankers. They opposed bonuses, 
salary increases and golden handshakes, even when these had been agreed by 
supervisory boards and shareholders in a completely legal manner. Dutch consumers 
lost trust in their own banks. And they keep on distrusting their banks, as the 2016 
survey by the Dutch Banking Association (NVB, 2016) indicates: 55 percent of bank 
clients do not trust banks. 
 
I have conducted a survey among the detested bankers themselves, about trust, 
motivation, and leadership (see for the full report by Irene van Staveren and Rens van 
Tilburg, 2015). I wanted to find out what drives these professionals, how they relate to 
each other, and how they experience their leadership. I contacted all 7,000 bank 
employees who are member of the main three labour unions (FNV, CNV, and De Unie). 
This has resulted in 617 complete survey forms, filled in anonymously, online. Table 1 
provides the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (percentages between brackets). N = 617 
sex male female   
 370 
(0.60) 
247 
(0.40) 
  
      
age under 50 50 and older   
 266 
(0.43) 
351 
(0.57) 
  
     
salary 
(euro 
p/m) 
<4,000 4,000-6,999 7,000-9,999 10,000 or more 
 291 
(0.47) 
280 
(0.45) 
39 
(0.6) 
7 
(0.1) 
     
bank ABN AMRO 
bank 
ING bank Rabobank other 
 188 
(0.30) 
153 
(0.25) 
206 
(0.33) 
70 
(0.11) 
Source: own results 
The general view from the descriptive statistics is that the sample does not seem to 
provide a very biased picture. The female/male ratio is quite similar to that of the 
statistics of the banking sector in total, and so does the salary distribution and 
distribution over the various individual banks. Only the age is a bit higher than on 
average for the sector (57 years versus 50 years). 
 
In this article, I focus on the survey results that help to address the question of why it is 
that bankers in the Netherlands are so much distrusted and how that is related to the 
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prevailing banking culture. The objective of this article therefore is to find out which 
elements of banking culture may help to explain the continued low trust of banks and 
bankers in the Netherlands. 
 
1. Banker's own views of banking culture 
 
The first indication that banks have not really improved their service delivery to clients 
since the crisis hit in 2008, is the response to the question whether the bankers 
themselves see an improvement in service delivery. Figure 1 shows the results. 
 
 
Figure 1. Do you observe a change in the quality of service of your bank since the 
crisis? 
 
 
Source: own results 
The results indicate that on average, bank employees see no improvement in service 
delivery between 2008 and 2014. So, when clients complain about their banks, the 
ground for their grudges is not entirely irrational. Their view, which might be labelled 
as "nothing has changed", is actually confirmed by the average bank employee, based 
on inside knowledge. About a third of the bankers sees improvement, a third observes a 
worsening of services and another third finds no change at all. 
 
32%
28%
31%
9%
Better Same Worse No opinion
4 
 
One of the blames on bankers is that they would be greedy and selfish, driven by a 
highly competitive banking culture. Since the crisis, Joris Luyendijk, a Dutch journalist 
and anthropologist, has interviewed over two hundred London City bankers in order to 
learn about the banking culture in this sub-sector of haute finance (Luyendijk, 2016). 
He was struck by the highly competitive banking culture, characterized by low job 
security, fear for dismissal, distrust among colleagues, and intimidation by bosses, all 
for the sake of winning - a new client, a higher sales volume than colleagues, and 
eventually a bigger bonus. Of course, the consumer banking market cannot be compared 
to the trading and investment-banking sector, and the UK labour market context cannot 
be compared with the more regulated Dutch one. But it did seem reasonable to check if 
perhaps also here a competitive atmosphere is present and is valued and supported by 
the bank employees. Therefore, I asked the bankers about their favourite work 
atmosphere, comparing between a competitive environment, a structured, hierarchical 
environment and a warm, caring environment. The results of their preferences for a 
competitive work atmosphere are presented in table 2. To my surprise, the large majority 
did not prefer to work in a highly competitive environment. Only 16 per cent preferred 
to work in a competitive atmosphere. 
 
Table 2. Competitive work atmosphere 
I like to work in a competitive atmosphere  
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 9.72 9.72 
agree 6.00 15.72 
neutral 28.20 43.92 
disagree 38.09 82.01 
strongly disagree 17.99 100.00 
total 100.00  
Source: own results 
Another grudge of clients against bankers is about their salaries, in particular of those 
at the top. I therefore asked the bankers themselves what they thought of the salaries of 
their leaders. The results are presented in table 3. Three quarters of the bankers judge 
the top salaries too high. Again, we see internal support for the negative assessment of 
bankers from the outside. 
 
Table 3. View of top earnings 
I think the earnings of the top in 
my bank is: 
per cent cumulative 
too low 1.13 1.13 
correct 18.64 19.77 
too high 56.73 76.50 
no opinion 23.50 100.00 
total 100.00  
Source: own results 
5 
 
This brings me to the next topic, namely variable pay. This is not very common in the 
Dutch labour market. Actually, the sector where it is most common is the financial 
sector (Kea Tijdens and Maarten van Klaveren, 2008). I asked three questions about the 
role of variable pay, as shown in table 4. The first question was whether it would be a 
motivating factor. The results show an equal split between those who agree and those 
who disagree. This is not a strong support for the effectiveness of variable pay. This is 
in line with the earlier result showing low support for a competitive work environment. 
The second question was about the standard reply by bank leaders supporting variable 
pay, namely that it would help banks to attract the best bankers, which in turn would 
help to serve the clients best. But the average bank employee does not show wide 
support for this view. A majority (55 per cent) clearly disagrees with this argument. The 
third question about variable pay was about a critique that supports client's view that 
variable pay would have perverse incentives. I asked about a possible short-term focus 
that may be reinforced by variable pay. The results point out that the large majority of 
bankers (71 per cent) support this critique.  
 
Table 4. Views on variable pay 
 Do you think that 
variable pay 
motivates? 
 
Do you think that 
variable pay helps to 
attract the best 
bankers? 
Do you think that 
variable pay can 
result in short term 
focus? 
 per cent cumul. per cent cumul. per cent cumul. 
strongly agree 5.51 5.51 2.43 2.43 30.47 30.47 
agree 34.04 39.55 17.99 20.42 40.68 71.15 
neutral 21.39 60.94 24.64 45.06 16.53 87.68 
disagree 27.39 88.33 36.47 81.52 10.86 98.54 
strongly disagree 11.67 100.00 18.48 100.00 1.46 100.00 
total 100.00  100.00  100.00  
Source: own results 
In Dutch banks, variable pay is either absent since the crisis or plays a relatively small 
role, up to ten per cent of annual salary.  
 
What may be more influential is the human resources system of motivation and 
measurement of performance through targets. I asked whose performance was measured 
with clearly defined targets. 74 per cent said that their performance was assessed by 
such targets. When I asked whether they felt motivated by their targets, only 14 per cent 
indicated this was the case. So, again, a management tool fitting a highly competitive 
environment is not having the expected motivating effect on ordinary Dutch bank 
employees. But it is precisely one of the key HRM tools, next to variable pay, that 
dissatisfied clients often refer to when judging bankers. These findings indicate a puzzle: 
if banks want to regain trust from their clients but they continue with HRM policies that 
are distrusted by clients and not perceived as motivating by bank employees, why do 
banks stick to such policies? 
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Connecting the two HRM tools that are most criticised by clients (as well as by 
politicians who stand up as spokespersons for the dissatisfied bank clients), I show in 
table 5 the results for the question on the relationship between targets and variable pay. 
As the results indicate, for almost 30 per cent of the sample, the two were related. So, 
for this group, targets may have a relatively strong perverse effect. But the majority does 
not receive financial incentives when they perform above-target. However, this does not 
imply that there is no perverse incentive driven by the targets themselves. Not meeting 
targets will of course influence management decisions in terms of promotion, fixed 
salary raises and job security. 
 
Table 5. Targets and variable pay practices 
 My performance is controlled 
by targets which are linked to 
variable pay 
 per cent cumulative 
strongly agree 3.89 3.89 
agree 25.93 29.82 
neutral 21.72 51.54 
disagree 29.34 80.88 
strongly disagree 19.12 100.00 
total 100.00  
Source: own results 
 
2. Solutions in banking culture? 
 
The previous section has indicated that much of clients’ dissatisfaction with bankers 
may not so much be a problem of individual bankers and their greed and self-orientation, 
but rather a problem of a dysfunctional banking culture. The problem does not seem to 
lie with a few rotten apples in the basket but with an overall management approach 
focusing on pre-defined performance targets, competition between employees, and 
carrots and sticks attached to performance. Firing a few bankers and hiring new ones 
would in that case not be a solution, because the new hired employees would be 
expected to adapt to the culture they work in, if not by agreement, than by force of the 
pressures to make the best of it and ultimately to keep their job. 
 
Banking culture is influenced from within but also from outside. An influential outside 
factor is regulation. Since the crisis, the Dutch Financial Market Authority (AFM), a 
government supervisory body, has developed some tools to influence and monitor 
banking culture (see, for information, the website: https://www.afm.nl/en). The tools 
include an integrity test for board members of banks, a dashboard for behavioural 
dimensions of financial decision-making, an innovation hub for testing new financial 
products, and non-financial criteria for reporting. But not only the government has 
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imposed more rules on bankers, also the Dutch Banking Association, mentioned earlier, 
has agreed on behavioural regulation. The self-regulation package is quite extensive and 
includes a banker's oath, disciplinary law, and the trust monitor mentioned in the 
introduction. 
 
In my survey, I asked the bank employees whether they think that the new behavioural 
rules will help to put the interests of clients more centrally. Table 6 shows the results.  
 
Table 6. Behavioural rules and client interest 
Do you agree that behavioural rules will help to put 
client interest more centrally? 
per cent cumulative 
yes 23,18 23,18 
no 57,05 80,23 
no opinion 19,77 100,00 
total 100,00  
Source: own results 
The results show that the majority (57 per cent) has no confidence that the stricter 
behavioural rules will improve their bank’s service delivery to clients. Only 23 per cent 
believes such rules will help to serve clients interests. How to interpret this finding? Are 
bankers cynical? Or are they realistic and feel that the problem is deeper rooted? 
 
Well, the responses to other questions about changes to the dominant culture indicate 
that it is a bit of both. They indeed seem quite cynical when it comes to their leadership, 
who should set the example for adhering to the stricter behavioural rules. But they do 
not see their leadership to walk the talk. 78 per cent states that they see their leaders talk 
about the importance of serving client interests. While 28 per cent states that they 
actually see this in their leaders' policies, strategies, and behaviour. At the same time, 
the bank employees seem to be aware that the problem of clients distrust is a complex 
problem that cannot be solved simply with behavioural rules for bankers added to the 
prevailing competitive banking culture. They seem to recognize that the problem of 
clients distrust is full of ethical dilemma's. And that it relates to the very culture of banks 
as expressed in the leadership, performance measurement, systems of rewards, and 
perhaps even in the additional rules that were supposed to bring client trust back. 
 
3. More rules as part of the problem, not the solution 
 
The banking culture relies on individual performance targets, and for a third of the 
sample these are linked to variable pay. At the same time, the Dutch banking sector is 
downsizing, implying several rounds of dismissals of thousands of employees. The only 
bank that is growing in business and employees is the Triodos bank, which focuses on 
social and environmental sustainability. They have seen their number of clients more 
than double since the crisis - clients who left Main Street banks in favour of a bank that 
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was not at all involved in the derivatives trade, the Libor manipulation, and the usury 
mortgage insurances.  
 
The bank employees in my sample indicated that they feared dismissal in the next round. 
Indeed, 69 per cent indicated that they were afraid that they would become redundant. 
But this was not the only threat they felt in their endeavours to serve clients the best 
they can. A significant share of the bank employees also indicated that they feel very 
little or no space to make their own ethical judgments in serving clients. A quarter 
indicated to feel no autonomy and another quarter said that they have no space for taking 
any own initiative for serving client interests. 
 
These results point out that there is probably a deeper problem than merely cynicism 
about the leadership not walking the talk. The bank employees themselves feel that they 
lack the room for manoeuvre to take the right decisions for their clients. In order to test 
for this possibility, I did two cross tabulations. One, shown in table 7, with a question 
about client interest being under pressure on the one hand and the question about space 
for taking own initiative on the other hand. The other one, shown in table 8, with the 
question about targets being motivating on the one hand and a question whether they 
think that sales targets are in clients' interests on the other hand. Let's first look at the 
results shown in table 7.  
 
Table 7. Own initiative and client interest 
 There is much space for own initiative 
Client 
interest 
under 
pressure 
 very 
much 
agree 
agree neutral disagree very 
much 
disagree 
total 
often 7 54 82 80 24 247 
sometimes 24 112 69 51 5 261 
never 16 50 8 5 1 80 
no opinion 0 15 6 6 2 29 
total 47 231 165 142 32 617 
Pearson chi2(12)=110.6703; p=0.000. 
Source: own results 
The cross tabulation shows a statistically significant relationship between the two 
questions. It shows that 42% of those who say that work pressure often constrains client 
interest, has little space for own initiative. Only 25% of this group says that they have 
much space for own initiative. Apparently, those who feel most constrained by either 
targets or new regulation, recognize the most that client interests are under pressure. 
This may imply that additional rules trying to change banking culture, may not reduce 
the pressure on client interests but may rather increase this pressure. 
 
Table 8 shows a statistically significant relationship between being motivated by targets 
and believing that sales targets are in the interests of clients. The results point out that 
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of those who think that sales targets are not in the interest of clients, only 10% is 
motivated by targets, while 69% of this group dismissing sales targets is not motivated 
by targets in general. In other words, when targets are a motivating factor for bank 
employees, they are more likely to believe that sales targets are in the interest of clients. 
So, when targets constrain behaviour in the way that HRM policies like to see this being 
done, namely through extrinsic motivation, employees seem to justify those targets that 
are most directly contributing to client distrust. The distrust clients feel because they are 
advised to buy products that are not in their interest or which turn out to be expensive 
or which show to be very inflexible during hard times. 
 
Table 8.  Targets and client interest 
 Motivated by meeting targets 
Sales targets 
are in the 
interest of 
clients 
 very 
much 
much neutral little very 
little 
total 
very much 
agree 
0 0 3 2 1 6 
agree 1 18 21 15 9 64 
neutral 5 22 58 63 9 157 
disagree 3 23 72 135 43 276 
very much 
disagree 
3 9 12 34 56 114 
total 12 72 166 249 118 617 
Pearson chi2(16)=126.1854; p=0.000. 
Source: own results 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The results of my survey among more than six hundred bankers in the Netherlands 
indicate that the continued distrust of banks and bankers by clients may be related, at 
least partially, to the dominant banking culture rather than to the immorality of (some) 
individual bankers. This finding is in line with other studies, for example by Charles 
Ellis (2008) on the cultural difference between partnerships and publicly listed banks 
and by Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr and Michel André Maréchal (2014) on dishonesty and 
banking culture. The dominant banking culture is not widely valued and supported by 
the very people who work in these banks. Only a minority feels motivated by targets 
and believes that sales targets are in the interests of clients. The majority observes a 
large gap between the walk and the talk of their leadership about serving client interests. 
And the behavioural rules forced upon them by government regulators and sector-level 
self-regulation seem not to increase but rather to reduce their opportunities to take the 
right decisions for clients. 
 
Of course, more research is needed for a more detailed analysis of banking culture and 
for a better understanding of clients’ distrust. That is precisely why more 
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interdisciplinary studies are necessary, in particular by economists, taking into account 
insights from cultural studies, management studies, and the humanities on the why and 
how of motivation and morality. But the current study at least points at the need of banks 
in the Netherlands to move beyond dominant HRM practices and to work on cultural 
change towards cooperation, sharing, and reflection. For example by moving away from 
a dominant focus on utility maximization towards a focus on the ethics of care (Thomas 
Hawk, 2011; Ricardo Crespo and Irene van Staveren, 2012). If the leadership of Dutch 
banks really want to get clients' trust back, they might better start with an open 
discussion of the ethical dilemmas in their daily work, and setting examples of how to 
deal with these, instead of going for the easy option of adding more rules and relying on 
ever more refined performance targets. Money is a matter of trust. This implies that 
banking can only function properly when bank leaders trust their employees and when 
bank employees trust each other. This requires a shift away from a competitive banking 
culture towards a trusting culture, with sufficient space for discussion and reflection and 
without fear and taking own initiatives for improving client service. Only then, clients 
may begin to trust bankers again. 
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